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discriminatory epistemic injustice

📖 Definitions

"A first point to make is that this kind of epistemic injustice is fundamentally a form of (direct or indirect) discrimination. The cause of testimonial injustice is a prejudice through which the speaker is misjudged and perceived as epistemically lesser (a direct discrimination). This will tend to have negative effects on how they are perceived and treated non-epistemically too – secondary aspects of the intrinsic wrong. The cause of a hermeneutical injustice is a background inequality of hermeneutical opportunity – specifically, hermeneutical marginalisation in relation to some area of social experience. This puts them at an unfair disadvantage in comprehending and/or getting others to comprehend an experience of that kind (a somewhat indirect discrimination)" (Fricker 2017, 53; cf. David Coady 2010; 2017)

🔗 Relations

📚 References

  • Coady, David. 2010. “Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice.” Episteme 7 (2): 101–13. https://doi.org/10.3366/epi.2010.0001.
  • Coady, David. 2017. "Epistemic Injustice as Distributive Injustice." In The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, edited by I.J. Kidd, J. Medina, and G. Pohlhaus, Jr. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315212043
  • Fricker, Miranda. 2017. "Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice." In The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, edited by I. J. Kidd, L. Medina, G. Jr. Pohlhaus. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315212043.